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Abstract 
This paper examines the strengths and limitations of the idea of justice as a way of exploring and 
assessing the legitimacy of the EU. Justice is either conceived of 'in' various specialist policy 
sectors (environmental, security, gender etc.,), so responding to a disaggregated notion of the EU 
polity and its legitimacy. Or justice is conceived of as a feature 'of' the EU as a whole - so 
responding to a holistic notion of the EU polity and its legitimacy. On the one hand, the 
disaggregated approach can at best be supplementary to the holistic approach, since, as the 
European financial crisis has once again vividly exposed, the EU can and does develop 'joined-up' 
policy with significant cross-sectoral consequences across its 28 member states. On the other hand, 
a more rounded idea of justice stands as a means of collective self-authorisation that complements 
democracy - itself indispensable but problematic in the EU context - as a way of thinking of 
legitimacy in polity-holistic terms. In particular, the recent popularity of a conception of justice as a 
'right to justification ' seeks to combine the 'democratic' merit of equal subjective right with an 
objective concern for good public-regarding reason. The paper concludes by discussing the 
strengths and limitations of the idea of justice as the right to justification. 
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Justice in and of the European Union  
 
 
Neil Walker 
 
Introduction: In the name of European justice 
 
There are some good reasons why we might find justice attractive as an organising concept as we 
seek to work out what is required for the European Union to achieve and maintain legitimacy before 
its people(s), and as we endeavour to assess how, where  and why it is falling short. These reasons, 
however, do not offer any guarantees that justice will in fact measure up to the task of constructive 
critique and critical reconstruction. Indeed, some of the factors that might persuade us to invest in 
the language of justice in the EU context also reflect and reinforce certain shortcomings in the 
capacity of the ‘j’ word to supply a reliable compass of political morality for the world's first post-
state polity. In what follows, I will elaborate these points. I will conclude, however, that, while we 
should be ever alert both to the temptation of overstating the claim of justice as some kind of master 
discourse in the European context, and to the danger that such a claim merely symptomises rather 
than resolves the puzzle of supranational legitimacy, there is nevertheless considerable merit in 
persevering with the project of examining the EU in the name of justice  
         The analytical key lies in the potential of the language of justice to impact on the EU 
legitimacy debate at two levels. It is this double possibility, but also the complexity, even 
confusion, of the relationship between these two levels, which underscores the promise, but also the 
pitfalls, of the EU's justice discourse. To understand how this argument proceeds, we must begin 
with certain peculiarities associated with the concept of justice itself. 
 
The Agility of Justice 
 
Justice is an extremely agile concept. By this I mean more than that it can be shaped and reshaped 
to mean different things to different people. That certainly is the case. There are many different 
theories and conceptions of justice, and these are often mutually inconsistent. Justice has no fixed 
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meaning, no settled criteria. It is patently a contentious, and, indeed, a contested concept.
1
 Agility, 
however, suggests something beyond mere flexibility and diversity of theoretical approach towards 
a common object. It concerns, in addition, the ability of the idea of justice to move nimbly between 
various sites and to travel easily up and down the scale of abstraction; that is to say, its capacity to 
refer to quite different objects, or focal concerns, and to sound at various quite distinct stages of 
remove from social and political practice.  In particular, justice can refer variously to individuals, or 
to relations between individuals or among small groups, to particular sectors or segments of 
common life and common public policy, to certain specific social or political institutions, to the 
society or the polity as a whole, or, indeed, to the totality of relations across the planet. In a 
nutshell, justice can be personal, interpersonal, sectoral, institutional, polity-holistic, or global. 
        That justice can be understood as a personal trait is a position that goes back as far the classical 
treatment of Plato and Aristotle. For the Greek philosophers the just individual is a virtuous 
individual, someone who is guided by a vision of the good. The idea of interpersonal justice, too, 
has Aristotelian roots. The dyad, or the small group, provides the most immediate context and 
measure of personal virtue, the setting within which the credentials of the just individual are most 
directly put to the test. Indeed, it is in the writings of Aristotle that we find the first formulation of 
the notion of commutative justice - of just action and just consequences considered within the frame 
of interpersonal transactions. And it is in these same writings that we find the first articulation of 
the familiar, field-defining distinction, more commonly associated with Aquinas, between 
commutative justice as the standard appropriate to the micro-context of exchange relations, and 
distributive justice, which is a standard more appropriate to the macro-context of wider societal 
relations. 
           Sectoral justice already assumes just such a macro-context of the just allocation of benefits 
and burdens across a broader population. The object of analysis here is a particular domain of 
practice, and of practical consequences. Sectoral justice, then, can refer to a clearly defined social 
constituency - justice, say, for university students, or for war veterans, or for dementia sufferers. Or, 
more broadly, it can identify a significant dimension of societal relations and public policy - from 
environmental justice, or health care justice, to something as expansive and open-ended as 
economic or social justice. An assessment of sectoral justice will often require us to look at the 
contribution of relevant sectoral institutions, but we are also interested in the justice of a specific 
category of institutions for reasons apart from a general sectoral audit. These are the public 
institutions concerned with the provision of Civil and Criminal Justice - police, courts, prisons and 
                                                 
1
  See e.g. Neyer, this volume 
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the like. For these institutions, justice is such a focal concern that it provides the language of their 
official (and everyday) description. That is to say, these are nominate institutions of Justice - public 
bodies directly charged with the responsibility of delivering or guaranteeing at a societal level a 
particular range, type and pattern of just exchanges and outcomes, rather than institutions that exist 
for other dedicated purposes but whose objectives may also be evaluated in terms of their broader 
contribution to sectoral justice, or to polity-holistic justice. 
 
Polity-holistic justice, as the label suggests, is concerned with the justice of the political community 
as a whole. In Rawls’s famous formulation, it may only be the “basic structure”2 of the relevant 
polity and society with which such a general theory of justice is concerned – the political 
constitution, the legal system, the economy, the family, and so on. But what distinguishes this 
perspective from the sectoral or any other approach is that it is concerned with the general 
responsibility of a political community to promote or secure justice for and amongst its members 
and associates. Quite how far that responsibility extends – how ‘basic’ should be the basic structure 
- is itself controversial between different conceptions of justice, but what all polity-holistic 
conceptions hold in common is a concern with the overall framework, scope and pattern of the 
polity’s contribution to justice within the relevant community, and so to the justice – or justness of 
the polity as a whole. 
        Global justice, finally, extends even further than the polity. It concern the entire globe, and, to 
develop a distinction already introduced, it can be conceived of either in holistic terms – with the 
basic structure  of global institutions and arrangements as a whole , or,  more commonly, as a series 
of sectoral projects, from global peace and the global environment to migration policy and access to 
basic material resources.
3
  
          The agility of the justice concept makes it particularly well adapted to the situation of the 
European Union. Granted, one influential recent critique of the European Union holds that its public 
culture has been progressively concerned too much with the rhetoric of values and too little with the 
                                                 
2
  J. Rawls A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).  
3
  See e.g. T. Nagel , “The Problem of  Global Justice  (2005) 32  Philosophy and Public Affairs  (No 2). 
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cultivation of individual virtue
4
 – including, presumably, the virtue of justice. Yet, however we 
judge this criticism, in other respects the European Union appears to be a fertile environment for 
considerations of justice.  The four freedoms that lie at the Union’s core can all be seen as particular 
forms of transactional freedom (in respect of the offer and receipt of goods, services and capital, 
and with labour mobility), and, as such, they are concerned with a certain (if far from 
uncontroversial)  conception of justice in interpersonal exchange relations. Less contentiously, the 
European Union endeavours to make a contribution to various forms of sectoral justice – 
environmental, gender, disability, educational, health care etc - as the upper tier of governance and 
regulatory capacity within a multi-level continental system.  Furthermore, the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, which has been at the cutting edge of the EU’s development beyond social and 
economic policy for two decades now, provides a clear and prominent example of justice as an 
institutional ideal.
5
 And if we consider the EU’s external relations, the past 20 years has again 6 
witnessed a significant development of that profile, including its key input, for better or worse, 
within an even more extensive multi-level governance framework into various sectoral dimensions 
of global justice, such as migration, food security and climate change.
7
 
        It is at this point the two-level quality of EU justice discourse comes into focus. To draw upon 
the terminology of my title, the above analysis demonstrates how all manner of forms and types of 
justice - interpersonal, sectoral, institutional and global - are relevant to and treated in the European 
Union by its various organs and through its various forms of law and policy. Yet, these examples, 
for all their dense versatility, do not directly and do not obviously speak to the justice, or justness, 
of the European Union as a whole. For that, we need to return to the final element of justice’s 
flexible remit, namely justice considered in polity-holistic terms.   
 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. J. Weiler  “60 Years since the first European Community- Reflections on Political Messianism” (2011)22 
EJIL 303-311. 
5
  See e.g. Douglas-Scott, this volume   
6
 Given early impetus by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht’s development of a Second Pillar of Foreign and Security Policy 
alongside its Third Pillar of Justice and Home Affairs. On the expansion of the EU’s outward-looking global remit more 
generally, see  Gráinne de Búrca, Europe’s Raison D’Etre, in Dimitry Kochenov and  
Fabian Amtenbrink (eds) The European Union’s shaping of the International Legal Order (Cambridge: CUP, 2013) . 
2013). 
7
 See e.g. J Scott and  L. Rajami Climate Change Unilateralism’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 469 . 
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The elusive legitimacy of the EU 
 
It is here, however, that we begin to glimpse some of the potential shortcomings and pitfalls of the 
EU’s discourse on justice. On the one hand, under the various categories considered above, the 
language of justice is patently capable of making a rich contribution to a full and rounded 
evaluation of the EU’s role in national and transnational affairs. On the other hand, as we shall see, 
the question of the general polity legitimacy of the EU poses special difficulties, and these are 
reflected in the treatment of justice, perceived through a polity-holistic lens, as a factor in 
addressing that question. 
      The special problems of polity legitimacy are of two types, though they are closely related, and, 
indeed, shade into one another.
8
 In the first place, the very question of whether the EU qualifies as a 
self-standing polity, such that it makes sense even to think of it as the subject of general legitimacy 
claims or challenges, is controversial. More specifically, it is not clear that the EU is the kind of 
entity that meets the necessary minimum external and internal identity criteria – both sufficiently 
autonomous from other entities and sufficiently integrated in its internal structure and activity 
profile – that would make appropriate its subjection to the same kind of appraisal of its overall 
acceptability to it citizens and denizens as other discrete political communities, notably states. Can 
we even hold that the EU has a general responsibility to promote or secure justice for and amongst 
its members and associates, and that it should be judged in accordance with its fulfillment or 
otherwise of that responsibility?  And in the second place, to the  (inevitably controversial) extent 
that the EU may be regarded as a self-standing polity, and the previous question can in principle be 
answered in the affirmative, as there is no supranational genus of which it is a species, the relevant 
standards by which its legitimacy should be assessed are also deeply uncertain and contentious. If it 
is at all a distinct polity, it is certainly a highly distinctive kind of polity, and so how we go about 
measuring the legitimacy of its contribution to the world remains a matter of deep disagreement. 
       How, precisely, does the elusive quality of the EU’s general polity legitimacy affect the place 
of justice - such a familiar discursive theme in various of the spheres of action of the EU - at that 
broader polity-holistic level of  debate. To answer this, we need to sketch out a taxonomy of the 
                                                 
8
 See e.g., N. Walker, “Europe’s constitutional momentum and the search for polity legitimacy” (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 211-38. 
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candidate ways of addressing legitimacy within the EU that is sensitive to the deeper contestation 
over the very idea of polity legitimacy.  
 
Four Approaches to Polity Legitimacy  
 
Four broad approaches can be identified, these located along a spectrum of greater or lesser 
scepticism about the very idea of polity legitimacy in the EU context. On the sceptical side of the 
divide, we can identify disaggregated and dependent approaches, while on the polity-affirmative 
side we can identify democratic approaches alongside other approaches to polity legitimacy based 
upon collective self-authorisation.  Pursuing a strategy of elimination, let us begin by looking at the 
two approaches – one from either end of the spectrum - that do not directly engage questions of 
justice. On the sceptical side, there is the dependent approach, while on the affirmative side there is 
the democratic approach.  
 The very conditions of emergence of the EU ensured a strong early bias towards dependent 
forms of legitimacy.  Born as an  international organisation in the Treaties of Paris and Rome, albeit 
one with an unusually  'thick' and penetrative policy remit,  for its first 30 years the EU  tended to 
be justified in official discourse  in terms that reflected the externality of its founding mandate and 
momentum.  Lacking its own conception of popular sovereignty -  of independent pouvoir 
constituant, its legitimation strategies were instead linked to various pre-given sources or standards. 
It was justified primarily in intergovernmental terms, as the delegated ‘creature’ of its member 
states.
9
  In turn, legitimation through the indirect authorisation of the member states encouraged or 
accommodated other approaches that stressed the modesty, non-contentiousness and containable 
character of the supranational remit.   The EU was treated variously, and often cumulatively,  as  the 
recipient and “trustee” of a clear and clearly delimited legislative or policy mandate,10  as the 
disinterestedly efficient or expert “technocratic” 11   instrument for the realisation of a set of   
                                                 
9
  Se e.g. P. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation State  (Oxford: OUP, 2010).   
10
  See e.g.  G. Majone “Delegation of Powers and the Fiduciary Principle” in his Dilemmas of European Integration 
(Oxford: OUP, 2005). 
11
 C. Lord and P. Magnette  “ E Pluribus Unum? Creative Disagreement about Legitimacy in the EU” (2004)  42 
Journal of Common Market Studies 183-204. 
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common commitments, or as the indispensable transnational means to pursue a range of shared 
interests of national states and citizen towards a positive net outcome or  “output”12. 
         However, the legitimacy of a delegate, or of a fiduciary, or of an efficient or epistemic 
authority, depends on the continuing control of the principal, the clarity of the mandate, or the 
reducibility of policy competence to special knowledge, experience or expertise alone. And as  is 
well-known, the adequacy of all of these justificatory models  has been challenged  by the 
expansionary dynamic of the Union. They have become  less plausible claims in a supranational 
polity increasingly attenuated from national control, with an ever broader and deeper policy agenda,  
with multiple veto points that work against any rolling back of community competence, and with a 
less comfortable  “permissive consensus”13 amongst key national elites across an ever larger Union.  
 One response to these developments has been a gradual tendency to view  the overall 
legitimacy of the EU  in original rather than derivative terms, and as a matter of resort to internal 
rather than external criteria. And by that path, with more or less explicit reference to the state as a  
justificatory template,
14
 democracy has been  treated by many as the natural  route to polity self-
legitimation.  As a relatively autonomous polity with an increasingly capacious and contentious 
agenda for the allocation of rights, risks and resources, the key to its legitimacy, on this view, lies 
with the collective self-determination of all those affected by the allocation of rights, risks and 
resources.  
 But such an approach has itself long been vulnerable to various objections.  One objection 
questions its basic plausibility, insisting upon the resilience of the so-called democratic deficit. It 
stresses the record of voter apathy and weak transnational political  party organisation   even in the 
face of the progressive empowerment of the European Parliament, indicates the continuing 
marginalisation of national Parliament despite recent subsidiarity-inspired reforms, emphasises the 
limited transparency and poor accountability of Council and Commission, and can cite  the failure 
of quasi-populist initiatives  such as the (Constitutional) Convention on the Future of Europe to find 
or nurture a fertile democratic subsoil. On this view, the lack of a European demos culturally self-
understood as such means that the motivational basis for a genuinely committed and contestatory 
                                                 
12
 As in Fritz Scharpf's “output legitimacy” Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: OUP, 1999). 
13
  See e.g., I. Down and  C. J. Wilson “From ‘Permissive Consensus’ to ‘Constraining 
Dissensus’: A Polarizing Union?” (2008) 43 Acta Politica  26-49.  
14
 See e.g.  F. Mancini “Europe: The Case for Statehood” (1998) 4 ELJ 29-42;  E. Eriksen  The Unfinished 
Democratisation of Europe (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
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democracy does not exist or is significantly deficient.  A second objection returns to some of the 
themes of the EU as a dependent polity and questions the appropriateness in general normative 
terms  of a solution which foregrounds democracy.  On this view, a key danger of supranational 
democratic overreach is that euro-democracy stands in a negative-sum relationship with - and so 
risks curtailing and chilling - democracy in its culturally more appropriate and more plausible 
forum of the nation state(s). A third and related objection holds that in its appeal to the unfettered 
authority of the collective will, the argument from democracy fails in any case to capture the more 
limited and specialist mandate of the EU as compared to the unlimited political mandate of the 
state. In terms of its basic architecture and its place in the overall structure of national, continental 
and global political authority, the EU is simply not a state, and  so the kind of argument for a 
thoroughgoing democratic ethos and audit that attends an entity whose very  raison d'être is one of  
collective self-determination  should not apply.
15
 In a nutshell, then, the argument from democracy 
as  a  pure alternative to the historically influential dependent approach to polity legitimacy  is 
subject to profound challenge on each of motivational, normative and structural grounds. 
       It is against this background of an unresolved and deeply unsettled legitimacy discourse that 
arguments from justice begin to come into their own at both ends of the spectrum. On the one hand, 
the disaggregated approach to legitimacy focuses on the many particular claims to legitimacy that 
the EU might make. Whereas the dependent approach to legitimacy does address the   EU  as a 
singular entity, albeit deploying  a thin and derivative model that takes  a modest view of the EU's 
polity status, a disaggregated approach does not concern itself at all with the polity-holistic 
dimension. That is to say, it does not seek to assess the legitimacy of the EU in accordance with a 
single test and standard, but instead hones in on particular aspects of its work and applies different 
criteria to each.  What justifies the EU from this perspective   is how its various functions and 
resources contribute to different policy objectives and ethical aspirations in the transnational sphere 
more generally.  The EU, then, on this view, is treated, implicitly or explicitly, as a mere bundle of 
capacities linked to more or less discrete and diverse objectives, rather than a singular entity whose 
justification as such is a politically salient or even meaningful question.  
 Though it is by no means the only language that may be adopted in accordance with this 
methodology, a focus on the many forms of justice pursued in the EU, interpersonal, and, in 
particular  sectoral, institutional and global, clearly fits with the disaggregated approach. Justice 
                                                 
15
  See e.g., A. Moravcsik, “What can we learn from the collapse of the European Constitutional Project?” (2006) 47 
Politische Vierteljahresschrift 2.  
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here provides the double function of supplying an affirmative  - and superficially consistent - moral 
language, but one that lowers the stakes for the EU to a test, or series of tests of consequential  
benefit. The EU's  various institutional and policy  platforms get judged for the various things they 
do, rather than the EU as a whole getting  judged for what it is. Indeed, from this perspective, the 
ontological question of the basic nature and purpose of the EU is entirely missing, and the EU's  
overall contribution, insofar as it is even a consideration,
16
 can only be measured as the sum of its 
various parts. 
 In the final analysis, however, the disaggregated approach is vulnerable to some of the same 
objections as the dependent approach. An approach that unbundles  the EU's various functions and 
capacities may tell us a lot about the justness of these various functions and capacities, but against a 
backdrop of the EU possessing broad and expanding multi-functional institutional capacity,  
including significant scope  to interfere with the multi-functional capacity of States  this can be no 
substitute for an approach that looks at it role and contribution in 'joined-up' terms. And so, 
reverting to the other end  of the spectrum,  we arrive at a consideration of those approaches, other 
than a pure democratic approach, which view the legitimacy of the EU in original or independent 
terms. Here, polity legitimacy is a measure of how the EU justifies itself as a matter of self-
authorisation,  speaking for and to its own collective constituency in light of its own self-standing 
role and contribution as a polity  rather than in terms dictated by external constituencies or 
standards. 
 In this final category we find  various attempts to discover a register of legitimation for the 
EU through identifying a bespoke set of  values, ideals or aspirations that define European  
supranationalism  on its own special terms and with reference to the common aspirations of the 
constituent European people(s). One well-known such position goes back to the founding post-War 
mission of the EU to promote peace and prosperity.
17
 However, as the chief sponsor of this 
approach would be the first to admit,
18
 in an age  of relative prosperity, however  ( and , since the 
financial crisis, increasingly ) unevenly distributed, and in which the sounds of war are heard only 
from beyond the EU's external borders, and in a time where the jurisdiction of the EU stretches well 
                                                 
16
  I do not mean to imply that those who talk about justice in this way necessarily intend to take a disaggregated  
approach to polity legitimacy, and in so doing to dismiss the significance  of more holistic approaches. They may or 
may not so intend, but the language of  differentiated justice can certainly lend support to  such a view. On the general 
trend to within EU policy studies towards disaggregating questions of legitimacy and effectiveness , see e.g. M. 
Jachtenfuchs, “The Governance Approach to European Integration” (2009) 38 JCMS  245-64.   
17
 See e.g. J. Weiler  The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1999). 
18
 See e.g. Weiler, above n4. 
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beyond the basics of wealth-creation and the avoidance of conflict, something broader and more 
responsive to the contemporary situation of the European continent is required.  
 It is unsurprising that a series of renewed efforts to think about the legitimacy of the EU in 
terms of a morally articulate from of collective self-authorisation have focused on matters of justice.  
On the one hand, unlike the derivative or disaggregated approaches, the invocation of justice 
implies an original form of  legitimacy.
19
 A claim to the justice of a polity or of its institutions is a 
'first' or foundational claim. It cannot be ‘read off’ from some other source, but must instead locates  
the polity itself as the “primary agent”20 or author of its own conception of justice. Yet, on the other 
hand, as compared to the  pure democracy-centred approach, the invocation of justice suggests a 
basis for legitimacy which can at once be both more specific and more universal; more customized 
to the peculiar needs of the EU since  what is ‘just’ is necessarily  tailored to context,  as well as 
more objectively defensible and  trans-contextually resonant  - the claim of justice being one that 
also implies adherence to certain general and invariant standards. 
        Yet justice, if it is to be appropriately customized and sufficiently attuned to the situation of 
the EU as a self-authorizing project, cannot be seen as a replacement for European democracy. 
Rather, it must be seen as a complementary imperative - as something that operates alongside 
democratic mechanisms or, at least, is tailored in such a way that it exhibits the kind of 
responsiveness and respect for political equality that we associate with democratic self-rule.  
        It is with this vital but delicate balance that recent attempts to redraw justice as a 'right to 
justification' are concerned. 
21
 They  combine the democratic spirit of  equality of subjective 'right' 
with the objectivity of  good   reasons  implicit in the notion of  a process of justifying political 
action to all affected. In Rainer Forst's original formulation of the justice-justification nexus, justice 
refers to "the human capacity to oppose relations of arbitrary rule or domination".
22
 What he calls 
                                                 
19
  See A. Williams The Ethos of Europe: Values, Law and Justice in the EU (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) ch.8. 
20
 O. O’Neill “Agents of Justice” in A. Kuper (ed) Global Responsibilities  (London: Routledge, 2005) , discussed in A. 
Williams  above n19,  298-9 
21
   See  R. Forst,   The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007); J. Neyer  The Justification of Europe: A Political theory of Supranational Integration  (Oxford: 
OUP, 2012). See also, the original EU-centred exchange,  J Neyer "Justice, not democracy; Legitimacy in the European 
Union”; 2010 48 JCMS 903-921; and (from a critically democratic perspective), see D. Nicol’s reply, and the riposte by 
J. Neyer 2012 50 JCMS  508-522, 523-529. See also contributions of Forst, Neyer and Nicol to the present volume. 
22
 This and following quotes are taken from his synoptic statement,  “Transnational Justice and Democracy” Normative 
Orders Working Paper 4/11 
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"the principle of general-reciprocal justification" is, he argues, the only means by which justice can 
be realized.   That principle holds that "every claim to goods, rights or liberties must be justified in 
a general and reciprocal manner, where one side may not simply project its reasons onto the other 
but must justify itself discursively." Such an approach stresses the priority of identifying such 
contexts or sites of 'general-reciprocal justification' as are associated with deeply recursive relations 
of power, with the EU clearly providing one such recursive context. 
      Forst, many of whose ideas have been adapted to the European context by Jurgen  Neyer,
23
 
clearly draws upon a Habermasian tradition of communicative rationality to flesh out a sense of 
communal justice. What matters, at root, is not the particular institutional form of the ‘give and take’ 
of public reason, but the underlying principle of general and reciprocal justification itself. We may 
avoid, then, the fetishism of certain supposedly paradigmatic institutional forms of ‘democracy’ 
whose plausibility and suitability in the EU context may be limited, such as a fully-fledged 
assembly democracy and Parliamentary executive, provided that the underlying principle of 
justification is respected. Equally, we must avoid the fetishism of discourses of expert rationality 
within specialist epistemic communities, if such rationality is not tested in sufficiently general and 
reciprocal manner with those it affects. 
     Yet, in the final analysis, the right to justification operates at too high a level of abstraction to 
provide, on its own,  a compelling answer to the questions of justice in the EU.  This, indeed, is 
evident in the ongoing disagreement between Forst, Neyer and others over the extent to which and 
ways in which  the right to justification can and should incorporate democratic imperatives.
24
 If we 
think back to the    motivational, normative and structural problems that attend the problem of 
supranational democracy, none of these disappears just because democracy is now blended with 
considerations of justice. Indeed, for Neyer especially, procedures of justification go a long way in 
eclipsing more familiar forms of democracy in the EU. In particular, the right to justification cannot 
fully  ‘square the circle’ of legitimating a polity where we continue to lack common agreement over 
and commitment to the kind and extent of polity autonomy it should boast or an overlapping 
common sense of  the forms and limits  of its  legitimate encroachment on national democratic 
forms.  
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      In some respect, the right to justification may seem to promise progress without having to solve 
fundamental questions about its democratic pedigree and prospects. In particular, an emphasis on 
the right to justification is salutary in questioning the privileging of the macro- over the micro-level 
that we often find in institutional analysis. It tells us that we should oppose, overcome or avoid 
relations of arbitrary rule or domination wherever they arise, and so do so in all the countless and 
variously configured sites of decision-making in the EU - in Comitology committees and in 
agencies, in the OMC and in national implementation contexts, as much as in the ‘high’ institutional 
sites of Commission, Council, Parliament and Court. What matters is the particular context and 
‘community’ of affected persons for any particular policy or decision, and in tracking the countless 
such communities of the affected, we can deconstruct the singular community of the EU into its 
many overlapping instances.  
    Yet this is true only up to a point. As we have already seen, we cannot reduce the legitimacy of a 
polity to the aggregation of its component capacities and competences, and an appeal to the 
institutional diversity of the EU only takes us so far.  Even in a broadly ramified and weakly 
centralized polity such as the EU,  the macro-level of policy choice retains a steering capacity, and 
this demands its own ‘right to justification’ at the macro scale. The Euro crisis and the move in the 
Council towards a strong form of "executive federalism"
25
  - discretionary in scope, deeply 
penetrative in reach, and "unbalanced"
26
 both in its  continued emphasis on market freedom over 
social provision and in the transnational distribution of its burdens - as part of a new cycle of 
"integration by fear"
27
 in response to that crisis, supplies vividly renewed  testimony to this. The 
EU, more than ever, is palpably more than the sum of its disparate parts, its central institutional 
settlement requiring its own justification. And certainly Forst himself, at least at the level of general 
theory, appears to accept this when stating that the conceptual task of constructing and maintaining 
a “basic structure of justification” in any particular context is typically given concrete and resilient 
institutional form in a democratically redeemable “justified basic structure” which applies 
recursively across space and time in similar contexts.
28
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Justifying Justification 
I began by suggesting that justice possessed certain strengths but also significant limitations as a 
tool of normative analysis for the European Union. As we have seen, justice as a low-tariff,  
context-specific concept - the justice in the European Union of my title - can be a very incisive 
instrument, provided its disaggregated parts are not understood as  fulfilling the function of polity-
holistic legitimation. In contrast, justice as just such a high-tariff, polity-holistic ideal – the justice 
of the European Union of my title - tends, by its abstractions and through its contestations, to 
highlight rather than resolve the more fundamental question of  polity legitimation.  
      Yet, as I have also sought I argue, the kind of democracy-supplementing substantive ideal of 
collective self-authorisation that the notion of justice - and, in particular, a democratically sensitive 
conception  of  justice as an encompassing procedural right to justification -  seeks to supply,  seems 
to be the only cogent way of thinking about polity legitimation in the EU. That it cannot easily 
reconcile democracy with the peculiarities of supranationalism, therefore, is no reason to dispense  
with justice discourse. Rather, its very capacity to illuminate the heart of the European problem is a 
good reason to persevere with it. 
 In so doing, let me conclude  by suggesting how we might pursue one more of Forst's  
insights. Forst’s is an ideal theory consciously targeted at non-ideal circumstances. He describes 
justice as a “recuperative institution”29 – with communities of justice throughout history typically 
constituting themselves not in anticipation of new webs of social and political relations but in 
response to and so “through existing relations of rule or domination”. In other words, the EU, just 
like many states, was born unfree and  ‘unjustified’. And, again like many states,  its expansion in 
practice has tended to outpace and evade  the constantly adjusting  reach of its procedures of 
justification. It follows that if  the continuous attempt to ‘recuperate’ lost ground is the normal 
dynamic of an expanding right to justification, there is no need in theory to judge the EU as a 
pathological instance.   
     There is no reason in principle, therefore, to see the EU as an unprecedented or irremediable case 
of original (or cultivated)  political sin. It may lack the traction of overlapping common  sense of its 
polity potential that aids the development of a strong sense of common political motivation,  and it 
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may have to face the complex algebra, and sometimes debilitating political gridlock,  of facing up 
to multiple avenues of claims to democratic 'recuperation' - national and supranational - 
simultaneously . The  failure of the first  Constitutional project  a decade ago and the ongoing crisis 
of common commitment and confidence  around the Euro today, certainly  provide vivid  testimony 
to this. But the very idea of 'recuperation' as the wellspring of politics - as the basic condition of 
political action -  alerts us to the fact that for as long as Europeans remain deeply implicated in 
common action - and they have never been more mutually implicated - then the need and the 
impulse to recuperate will remain. And this leaves us with no alternative but to continue to seek to  
fashion a basic structure of political institutions that satisfies the right to justification of all 
Europeans.
30
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